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Abstract
In this paper we will discuss a demand-led growth model which is constrained by economic policy. In this way, we will incorporate
an inflation targeting regime in the sraffian supermultiplier model in order to analyze how economic policy can influence the growth
rate of productive capacity. We will analyze an open-economy were inflation is a cost-push phenomenon and the monetary authority
can manage the nominal exchange rate through changes in interest rate differentials. As functional income distribution will depend
on the evolution of nominal wages, exchange rate and interest rate, we will show that inflation target system, in addition of not being
neutral in terms of long run growth, also can lead to different outcomes in terms of functional income distribution.
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© 2016 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1.  Introduction
The new consensus or the “three equation” model was fully analyzed by Carlin and Soskice (2010), Romer (2000),
Taylor (1997,2000) and now is becoming popular even in the undergraduate textbooks (Mankiw, 2010). The New
Consensus model with inflation targeting is based on the following theoretical structure: (i) the effective output depends
on the real interest rate (stimulating investment spending), (ii) the existence of an accelerationist Phillips curve and
(iii) a Taylor rule, relating the Monetary Authority response via nominal interest rate to deviations of inflation from its
target and output from its potential. The potential output is determined by the stocks of factors of production – capital
and labor – and their productivity, according to the neoclassical theory of value and distribution.
In an open-economy context, the new consensus model postulates that the Real Interest Rate Parity holds (Romer,
2006). It is implicit on this assumption that that the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity holds in the short run and that the
individuals operating in the exchange rate market have Rational Expectations and believe that the Purchasing Power
Parity holds in the long run (Lavoie, 2000).∗ Tel.: +55 21 3938 5237.
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The main results of this model are well known. The long-run core inflation is related with demand shocks and does
ot depend on the exchange rate (open-economy long run neutrality); the inflation control mechanism involves the
mpact of the real interest rate on aggregate demand, targeting a null output gap. There is no trade-off between inflation
nd productive capacity, since the latter is independent of the effective output1; and inflation target can always be
chieved, because the Monetary Authority can always set the real interest rate in line with the natural rate of interest.2
There are, however, a considerable number of works that evaluate critically the new consensus model in a closed-
conomy context. They show that by changing some of the hypotheses of this model (such as the accelerationist Phillps
urve), different results can emerge regarding output, productive capacity and inflation dynamics (Setterfield, 2004;
avoie and Kriesler, 2007; Lavoie, 2006; Atesoglu and Smithin, 2006; Serrano, 2006; Aspromourgos, 2007; Setterfield,
015). For open economy, we have few examples of alternative models, such as Cordero (2008) and Vera (2014).
In this paper we present a heterodox open-economy macroeconomic model that seeks to establish an alternative
iew to the “New Consensus” model and analyze the determinants of long-run inflation, the transmission channels
f monetary policy, the costs of such policy and its limitations. The structure of the model intends to be simple, in
rder to be comparable to the new consensus model. We will analyze an open-economy were inflation is a cost-push
henomenon and the monetary authority can manage the nominal exchange rate through changes in interest rate
ifferentials. In this model we will incorporate an explicit inflation target regime in the sraffian supermultiplier model3
n order to analyze how economic policy can influence the growth rate of productive capacity and the Functional
ncome distribution.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, the alternative model to the open-economy new consensus
ill be presented. In section 3, we will present the model closure and the analytical solution. In the fourth section, we
ill present some numerical simulations. Concluding remarks will be made on the last section.
.  An  alternative  model  to  the  open-economy  “new  consensus”
The alternative model presented here follows the same simplified scheme of the New Consensus model, but alters
ignificantly some theoretical assumptions: (i) First, the potential output or productive capacity of the economy follows
he long-run expected effective demand; we use the Sraffian supermultiplier to model the demand led growth of
roductive capacity. (ii) The output growth rate depends on the real interest rate (through the effect on autonomous
pending) and the real exchange rate (through the effect on exports). (iii) The Phillips curve is non accelerationist
partial inertia hypothesis) and depends on the role of nominal exchange rate, on imported inflation and on the degree
f distributive conflict, (iv) the nominal exchange rate depends on the interest rate differential and is subject to
peculation, and (v) the Monetary Authority seeks to achieve a pre-defined inflation target, through changes in nominal
nterest rate.
.1.  The  Srafﬁan  Supermultiplier  and  of  the  growth  rate  of  the  autonomous  components  of  effective  demand
The first assumption of our model is that the potential output or productive capacity of the economy (Y*) follows
he long-run expected effective demand. We use the Sraffian supermultiplier (Serrano, 1995) to model the demand-led
rowth of productive capacity.Following the tradition of Classical Political Economy, or the Surplus Approach, the potential output will be
onstrained by the scarcest factor, given the technical coefficients (Garegnani, 1962, 1990, 1992). Assuming that in a
apitalist economy in general we have no labor scarcity, the productive capacity of this economy will be determined
y the size of the capital stock and the technical capital-outpur ratio. This means that the potential output can be
1 In fact, although not explicit, “new consensus” economists believe that there is a negative relationship between high inflation rates and productive
apacity, in the sense that high inflation can create some inefficiencies, lowering the growth rates of potential output (See Taylor (1997) and Goodfriend
2004). Lavoie (2006) call this relationship “the hidden equation”.
2 Except when the MA reach the zero bound on interest rate policy (Goodfriend, 2004).
3 See Serrano (1995), Cesaratto et al. (2003). Lavoie (2014) and Allain (2015), Freitas and Serrano (2015), Serrano and Freitas (2015) and Pariboni
2015).
312 R. Summa / EconomiA 17 (2016) 310–323
reached even with structural labor unemployment.4 The equilibrium between aggregate demand and output and the
determinants of aggregate demand components are shown in Eqs. (1)–(4):
Y  =  I  +  C  +  G  +  X −  M (1)
C  =  w(1 −  t)Y  +  A  (2)
I =  v(d  +  ge)Y (3)
M =  mY (4)
We use the standard notation. In Eq. (1) Y  is the current level of effective demand and output. Eqs. (2) and (3)
show the components of the aggregate demand. In (2) we suppose a simple Kaleckian consumption function, where
aggregate consumption (C) depends on the Wage Bill (wage share (W) times disposable national income ((1 −  t)Y) and
an autonomous component (A); The aggregate investment spending (I) is fully induced by national income (3). This
means that the investment will be expanded in order to replace the depreciated capital stock (d) and to create productive
capacity in order to meet the expected average rate of growth of normal effective demand (over the life of investment),
(ge), and this also depend on the capital-output ratio (v). Imports are induced by the level of current effective demand
(4), where (m) denotes the imported coefficient.
Denoting Z  as the sum of the autonomous components of effective demand (Autonomous consumption (A), Gov-
ernment expenditure (G) and exports (X)), we can write short run equilibrium level of output as:
Y  = Z
1 +  m  −  w(1 −  t) −  v(d  +  ge) (5)
Eq. (5) shows the level of effective demand as a function of the autonomous components of aggregate demand and
the output Supermultiplier (Cesaratto et al., 2003.
Denoting z as the growth rate of autonomous spending, we suppose that z grows at an exogenous rate σ  but is also
influenced by (ex post) real interest rate (r).5This inverse relation reflects the negative effect of the real interest rate in
the growth rate of autonomous consumption:
z  =  σ  −  ϑ(i  −  π) (6)
Moreover, we assume that in the process of accumulation “ge” is made endogenous and is gradually revised as a
flexible accelerator process, and this gradual process with long lags is here modeled as small values of “x” (Cesaratto
et al., 2003).
get =  get−1 +  x(gt−j −  get−j) (7)
Therefore, the growth rate of effective demand and output, g, will depend on the growth rate of autonomous
spendings, z  (Serrano, 1995; Cesaratto et al., 2003).
g  =  z (8)
Since the capital-output ratio is given, the growth rate of productive capacity, g*, is determined by the growth rate
of capital stock. As the productive capacity depends on investment, and the flexible accelerator process ensures that the
4 As we assumed that the potential output level is restricted by the capital stock and technical coefficient, the growth rate of potential output
also will be restricted by growth rate of capital stock (and changes in technical coefficient). So, growth rates of productive capacity will not be
constrained by the ‘natural rate of growth’ since there are in the short run unemployed labor and in the long run, even if effective demand growth
rates are high, several mechanisms (like immigration, changes in the participation rate, Verdoon’s law etc) that can adjust the natural rate in order
to seek productive capacity growths rates.
5 In general, the IS curve is written in terms of the level of output and the real interest rate, and not growth of output as we are assuming here.
We are aware that this is a strong assumption. The ideia behind this relation is that booms of durable consumption goods and residencial investment
can be generated or aborted depending on the real interest rate. The relation between households’ credit conditions (which include real interest rate
but also other aspects) and the dynamics of autonomous spending is very complex and must be estimated empirically. However, if we replace Eq.
(6) by a regular IS curve relating the level of autonomous components of effective demand and the real interest rate, the only change in our model
results will be the trade-off between inflation target and output and productive capacity.
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nvestment will be gradually ajusted to meet the growth rate of effective demand, in the long run the potential output
evel will converge to:
Y∗ = Z
1 +  m  −  w(1 −  t) −  z (9)
So, the causality of the adjustment between productive capacity and long period effective demand will be from the
ormer in direction to the latter. Consequently, in the long period the level of output will be the same as the productive
apacity:
Y  =  Y∗ (10)
.2.  Cost-push  inﬂation
Let’s suppose a very simple economy which produces a basic commodity, using also labor and imported inputs.
 is the price of this commodity, a, m  and l  are respectivelly technical coefficicients of domestic inputs, imported
nputs and labor, W  is nominal wage, P* is the price of imported inputs in international currency and e  is the nominal
xchange rate. Let’s suppose also that this economy produces and export a non-basic commodity. The price level of
his economy will be:
P  =  (1 +  i)aP−1 +  lW  +  meP∗ (11)
In Eq. (11), i is the nominal interest rate. Here it is implicit that there is a process of equalization of the profit
ate to the interest rate set by the monetary authority, a la Pivetti (1991). The competition among capitalists ensures
his process of equalization from exogenous nominal interest rate to nominal profit rate, and it occurs through two
hannels: the oportunity cost of capital and the financial cost. In fact we are simplifying the original contribution of
ivetti (1991), which supposes that there is also a “Risk and trouble” factor that must be included in Eq. (11) (for more
n this pont, see also Serrano (1993), Stirati (2001) and Lima and Setterfield (2010)).
Inflation (π), measured by ln(P  −  P−1), will be the result of rate of change of nominal wages ( ˆW), nominal interest
ate (ˆi), nominal exchange rate (eˆ) and international inflation (measured in international currency), π*, as shown in
quation (12)6:
π  =  l∗ ˆW  +  m∗(eˆ  +  π∗) +  a∗ˆi (12)
To obtain a reduced form of the Phillips curve, we must discuss the dynamics of nominal wage. Eq. (13) shows that
ominal wage change depend on past overall inflation, output gap and an exogenous component (c).
ˆW  =  θπ−1 +  τ(Y  −  Y∗) +  c (13)
First of all, the parameter θ  represent the proportion of past inflation that workers can incorporate in their wage
ontracts. This parameter will depend on workers’ bargaining power (Ros (1989)). In this way, θ  has nothing to do with
he capacity of workers in forecast the future inflation.7 Workers, for example, can forecast very well the inflation rate
n the near future, but cannot be able to incorporate the whole forecasted inflation in their wage contracts, depending
n their bargaining power (Rowthorn, 1977).
The output gap is a proxy to demand shocks. When current output is above potential output (a positive output
ap), unit labor cost rises due to workers claims of higher wages.8 Finally, nominal wage can change due to other
nstitutional, cultural and political aspects that affect workers’ bargaining power, and this is represented in Eq. (13) by
c” (Kalecki, 1971; Rowthorn, 1977; Stirati, 1994, 2001).Substituting Eq. (13) into (12), the following reduced form of Phillips curve is obtained:
π  =  απ−1 +  β(Y  −  Y∗) +  l∗c  +  m∗(eˆ  +  π∗) +  a∗ˆi (14)
6 Notice that the parameters l*, m* and a* now reflect the weighted average of the cost components.
7 We are supposing here that inflation expectations are revised accordingly to inflation levels in the recent past. In this way, recent past inflation
s a good proxy to expected inflation, i.e., backward-looking expectations.
8 See Palumbo (2015) for the relation between worker’s bargaining power and the level of activity in the seminal Phillips (1958) work, See also
alecki (1943,1971).
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In Eq. (14), we suppose that inflation inertia (measured by the parameter α  = l*θ) is not complete.9,10 Also, we do
not suppose open economy neutrality11 and thus international inflation converted in domestic currency (eˆ  +  π∗) can
be different from domestic inflation, which means that real exchange rate can change over time.
Also, despite of the short period effects of output gap on inflation, in the long period, according to the sraffian
supermultiplier results (10), the productive capacity responds to effective demand and the output gap gradually closes.
In this case, demand-pull inflation pressures are temporary.
2.3.  The  multiplier  and  the  functional  income  distribution
Also from Eq. (11) we can determine the level of real wage of the economy. Dividing Eq. (11) by P and re-arranging,
we can determine the real wage level:
W
P
= (1 −  (1 +  i)/(1 +  π)a) −  m(eP
∗)/P
l
(15)
Supposing that the labor coefficient (l) is not changing, the wage share will depend on real interest rate and real
exchange rate. A rise in the real interest rate is expected to reduce the wage share, and real Exchange rate appreciation
has the efect of cheapening imported inputs and thus improving the workers purchasing power. So, an exchange rate
(depreciation) appreciation is related with a (fall) rise in wage share.
As the aggregate consumption function depend on the wage share (W), changes in the real exchange rate and the real
interest rate will alter the multiplier effect in equation (9). In attempting to close our model, we need only to discuss
the nominal interest rate setting mechanism and the nominal exchange rate determination.
2.4.  Nominal  exchange  rate  determination
In order to analyze the nominal exchange rate determination we need to look at the economy’s balance of payments.
The balance of payments is obtained by summing the balance of current account (CC) with financial account. The
financial account can be split into transactions that involve short run (FCP) and long run capital flows (FLP).
BP =  CC +  FLP +  FCP (16)
In a purely floating exchange rate regime, the balance of payments must sum to zero with no overall surplus or
deficit. This means that the current account balance must equal the financial account balance:
FCP =  −CC −  FLP (17)
Supposing that long run capital flows are exogenously determined, we must analyze the determinants of short
run capital flows and current account balance. In our model, the short run capital flows depends on the interest rate
differential between the domestic interest rate (i) and international rate (iW) (plus the sovereign spread (ρ) and expected
exchange rate change (ee+1 −  e)). The parameter F is an autonomous component of short run capital flows and   is the
sensivity of short run capital flows to interest rate differentials. We suppose that capital flows are not infinitely sensitive
to interest rate differentials.12
FCP =  F  +  δ(i  −  (iw +  ρ  +  (ee+1 −  e))) (18)
9 For a theoretical critique of the hypothesis of full persistence in the new consensus model, see Serrano (2006) Setterfield and Leblond (2003)
and Setterfield (2004). The usual condition in the new consensus macroeconomic models that the sum of effects on current inflation of past and
expected inflation is equal to one and the conclusion that follows that the effect of a single demand shock would be a permanent acceleration of
inflation.
10 Setterfield (2005), Setterfield and Lovejoy (2006) and Pollin (2002,2005) shows that when introducing explicitly some distributive conflict
variable in US Phillips curve, estimations of “a” fall considerably.
11 In an open economy new consensus model, the full pass-through from expected to actual inflation for the economy as a whole also requires the
assumption that relative Purchasing Power Parity holds empirically, that is, that domestic inflation must be equal to tradable goods inflation in the
local currency, and that the sum of a and m* is equal to 1.
12 See Summa (2015) and Serrano and Summa (2015) for this theoretical discussion. Even Blanchard (2016) now reached the same conclusion
that capital flows have finite elasticity.
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It is important to notice that the domestic interest rate does not necessarily adjust to the international rate (plus
overeign spread and Exchange rate change expectations). So the Monetary Authority can institutionally set the
omestic interest rate, and thus stimulate capital inflows or outflows.13
Supposing also that the international rate (iw) and the spread14 (ρ) are exogenous variables, we just need to discuss
he exchange rate expectations to solve the nominal exchange rate determination problem.
We assume that expected nominal exchange rate, (ee+1), is at least in part endogenous and dependent on the evolution
f the nominal exchange rate occurred in the near past. This is because the foreign currency can be seen as an asset,
ubject to speculation (Frenkel and Taylor, 2006). After a continuous process of nominal exchange appreciation, further
ppreciation could be expected in the future. Dealers speculating in the exchange rate market will thus avoid buying
oreign currency expecting that its price will be lower in the near future. This will lead to another round of currency
ppreciation, because foreign currency sellers will have to lower its price and buyers will only buy it if the price is
ower. As a consequence, a process of exchange rate appreciation can lead to expectations of appreciation (the same is
alid with processes of exchange rate devaluation) (Serrano and Summa, 2015).
Exogenous shocks can also influence expectations, like good or bad news about the future path of some external
ariables that affect currency dealers’ opinions about the exchange rate that will prevail in the future, reversing or
ggravating the process described above.
In the model, the best way to formalize the process described above is supposing that the exchange rate expectations
re adaptive, and subject to exogenous shocks (ϕ) related to news about relevant variables that influences currency
ealers’ expectations:
ee+1 =  ee +  h(e−1 −  ee) +  ϕ,  com b ≤  1 (19)
If we assume, attempting to simplify the model, that h  = 1 and ϕ = 0, expectations about exchange rate will depend
nly on the exchange rate prevailing one period ago:
ee+1 =  e−1 (20)
Replacing Eq. (17) in (16) we have:
−CC −  FLP =  F  +  δ(i  −  (iw +  ρ  +  (ee+1 −  e))) (21)
Eq. (21) determines the balance of payments equilibrium. Denoting F’ as the sum of the exogenous flows and the
urrent account balance (F′ = F  + CC + FLP), rearranging (21) and substituting nominal exchange rate expectations (20)
e have:
e  =  e−1 −  (i  −  iw −  ρ) − F
′
δ
(22)
Nominal exchange rate will thus depend on the past exchange rate, interest rate differential (plus sovereign spread),
xogenous capital flows and current account balance. And the change in nominal exchange rate (e  −  e−1) depends on
he interest rate differential. This means that a positive and constant interest rate diferential will lead to a process of
ominal exchange rate appreciation through time.15
This results from the exchange rate expectation effect through current exchange rate. A positive interest rate differ-
ntial with elastic expectations can lead to process of exchange rate appreciation, and this will bring expectations of
ther currency appreciation, reinforcing the process of Exchange rate appreciation again, and so on. The same unstable
rocess can occur in the opposite direction if the monetary authority set permanently the domestic interest rate bellow
nternational rate (plus sovereign spread).16
13 See Pivetti (1991, 2007) for the exogenous interest rate approach. For the interest rate exogeneity even in open economies, see Lavoie (2000,
001, 2002-2003), Pivetti (2001) and Serrano and Summa (2015).
14 The assumption of exogenous sovereign spread is quite strong, but in section 4.6 we discuss the implications of relaxing this hypothesis.
15 Notice that this result differs from uncovered interest parity model where a positive interest rate differential leads to a “once and for all” nominal
xchange rate appreciation through time, while in our model a process of nominal exchange rate appreciation follows from a positive interest rate
ifferential.
16 In pratice, monetary authorities are forced to manipulate interest rate differentials together with interventions in currency market, buying and
elling foreign reserves, but we will not incorporate this into our model.
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3.  The  model  closure  and  analytical  solution
To close our model we need to establish how the interest rate is determined. We suppose, as in the new consensus
model, that the monetary authority set the nominal interest rate in order to achieve inflation target (πT). The Monetary
Authority raises the nominal interest rate when inflation is above target, and lowers when it is below:
i =  i−1 +  γ(π  −  πT ) (23)
In order to obtain the analytical solution, we depart from the Phillips curve (Equation 14). The long run inflation
will depend on the permanent pressures on inflation. Demand shocks, as we discuss, are temporary as the productive
capacity adjusts to the current output level. In the long run, this source of pressure disappears. Cost-push shocks such
as changes in nominal interest rates (i) are also temporary, since there is a nominal interest rate (i  = iT) that is capable
of achieving inflation target. So, in the long run we do not expect changes in the nominal interest rate.
Consequently, in the long run, inflation will depend on international inflation, changes in nominal exchange rate,
on the degree of distributive conflict “c” and on the inflation inertia degree:
π  = l
∗c +  m∗(eˆ  +  π∗)
1 −  α (24)
We have the following system to solve:
z  =  σ  −  ϑ(i  −  π) (6)
eˆ =  −(i  −  iw −  ρ) − F
′
δ
(22)
i =  i−1 +  γ()π  −  πT (23)
π = l
∗c +  m∗(eˆ  +  π∗)
1 −  α (24)
From Eq. (24) we can deduce that, given international inflation, the share of imported inputs, inflation inertia degree
and workers’ bargaining power c, there is a change in nominal exchange rate that can bring long run inflation to the
target.
To achieve this exchange rate change, the monetary authority must set domestic interest rate above international
rate. We will denote the domestic interest rate necessary to change nominal exchange rate and thus to bring long run
inflation to the target as (iT). Replacing Eq. (24) in (22) and as if π  = πT →  i = iT, we have:
πT = l
∗c +  m∗(π∗ −  ((iT −  iw −  ρ) +  F ′/δ))
1 −  α (25)
Thus, the domestic interest rate necessary to change nominal exchange rate and thus to bring long run inflation to
the target (iT) will be:
iT =  π∗ +  (iw +  ρ) − F
′
δ
−
(
πT (1 −  α) −  l∗c
m∗
)
(26)
As we can see, there is an inverse relation between nominal interest rates and the inflation target. The slope of this
relation depends on the inflation inertia degree “a”, m* and l*c, while the position depends on international conditions
(πw, (iw + ρ), F′/δ).
Replacing iT and πT in Eq. (6) we find the growth rate of autonomous expenditures (z)
z  =  σ  −  ϑ
(
π∗ +  (iw +  ρ) − F
′
δ
)
+ ϑ
(
πT
( (1 −  α) −  l∗c
m∗
+ 1
))
(27)Eq. (27) shows us that there is a positive relation between the growth rate of autonomous spending (z) and inflation
target. So, the higher is inflation target, the higher will be growth rate of the growth rate of autonomous spending.
International inflation is inversely related with the growth rate of autonomous spending. This occurs because the
higher international inflation is, the greater will be the nominal interest rate differential to control domestic inflation.
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iven the inflation target, this means that we will have, as a by-product, a higher real interest rate, and consequently,
 lower growth rate of autonomous expenditures.
The same results aplly to the international interest rate and sovereign spread. A rise in this variables means that,
f the government wish to achieve the same inflation target, the domestic interest rate must rise to obtain the same
ominal exchange rate appreciation. This will result in higher domestic real interest rates and lower growth rates of
utonomous spending.
Finally, the growth rate of productive capacity will be the result of both autonomous spending and the multiplier,
hith the latter changing as consequence of variations in functional income distribution, according to Eq. (9) and (15).
.  Numerical  simulations
Once we established an analytical solution to the model in its simplest version, we can run numerical simulations to
ssess the behavior of some selected variables. The purpose of this exercise is to: (1) evaluate if the analytical solution
esults are valid; (2) evaluate the dynamic path in direction (or not) to the equilibrium position; (3) compare different
quilibrium positions when we change parameters, such as inflaton target
We will assess the path results of: 1. growth rates of productive capacity and Functional distribution of income
hen we have different (a) inflation target; (b) international inflation rate; (c) sovereign spread. We can also check the
ypothesis that, if the monetary authority controls the nominal interest rate, it can controls inflation rate in direction to
he target when the core inflation is cost-push and related with imported inflation. And finally, it will be analyzed the
ynamic path of real interest rate, real exchange rate and output gap related to different inflation targets.
In the numerical simulation exercise, the extreme hypothesis of h  = 1 in the adaptive exchange rate expectation (20)
s abandoned and the exchange rate expectations now depends on an average weight of past exchange rate.
The initial condition, parameters and exogenous variables supposed are: (a) inflation starts at 6%; (b) First exchange
ate expectations is 4,0 and the parameter h is 0,76; (c) International interest rate is 5% and sovereign spread is 2%; (d)
nitial domestic nominal interest rate is 20%; (d) Output and productive capacity initial levels are in equilibrium and
re equal to 400; (e) Exogenous component of growth rate of autonomous expenditures, σ  is 8%; (f) The monetary
uthority’s rule parameter γ  is 0,7; (g) a high value of δ, denoting that short run capital flows are highly sensitive to
nterest rate differentials. All the simulations start with the same initial conditions.
.1.  Alternative  inﬂation  target
In the first exercise, we change the monetary authority inflation target in order to analyze alternative paths of
roductive capacity growth rate, inflation rate, real interest rate, real exchange rate and output gap. Fig. 1 shows the
rowth rate of capacity paths to different inflation targets (2%, 5% and 7%). As it was expected, lower inflation targets
ill generate, as a by-product, lower growth rates of productive capacity. Inflation dynamics with different inflation
Fig. 1. Growth rates of productive capacity (g*) with different inflation targets.
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Fig. 2. Inflation rate dynamics with different inflation targets.Fig. 3. Real interest rate (r) with different inflation targets.
targets are showed in Fig. 2. It is interesting to note that Monetary Authority can achieve inflation rate target in the three
cases. It means that, even in an economy where the core inflation is cost-pushed and related with imported inflation, it
is possible to the Monetary Autority to control inflation rate using nominal interest as the only policy instrument.
Fig. 3 shows the dynamic paths of the real interest rate. Notice that this figure is related to Fig. 1 discussed above. It
shows that when the inflation target is lower, the Monetary Autority must set a higher nominal interest rate, resulting
in a higher ex  post  real interest rate (higher nominal rate plus lower inflation rate), and this will lead to lower growth
rates of productive capacity.
Output gap behavior is showed in Fig. 4. We can see that output gap endogenously tends to close in all the three
cases, although it will take longer time to converge when inflation target (and so growth rates of productive capacity)
is higher.We can see in Fig. 5 the path of real exchange rate. The result shows that, given that this domestic economy
face an international inflation and has an inflation target, the nominal exchange rate will appreciate more than inflation
differential, resulting in real exchange rate appreciation too. Note that this occurs to the three different inflation targets.
The higher is the inflation target, the higher will be inflation differential, and this will lead to a quicker process of real
exchange rate appreciation.
The last point to notice is that all the results were obtained with the monetary policy rule parameter γ  = 0.7. Even
with these parameter, inflation converges to the target as the MA set domestic nominal interest rate.This result could be
seen as puzzling to one that believes in the ‘new consensus model’relations, since in this model the γ parameter must
be greater than one, that is, the nominal interest rate must raise more than the difference between inflation and inflation
target, in order to guarantee a real interest rate change in the right direction. The point is that in the ‘new consensus
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Fig. 4. Output gap with different inflation targets.
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odel’, MA must change the real interest rate in order to affect output gap, and so to control demand-pulled inflation
ressures.
In our model, the transmission mechanism is from the nominal interest rate – through nominal interest rate differ-
ntial with nominal international interest rate plus sovereign spread – to the nominal exchange rate, which adaptative
xpectations can lead to a process of nominal exchange rate appreciation (or depreciation) and so to affect inflation
hrough time. So, it is easy to understand that a change in the nominal interest rate, even if it coincides at first with a
hange in the real interest rate in the opposite direction, can control inflation.
.2.  International  inﬂation
Now, we run another exercise changing international inflation and observing the results in relation to different
nternational inflation. The growth rates paths of productive capacity related to these different international inflation
ates are illustrated in Fig. 6. If the economy faces a lower international inflation, given the inflation target, the growth
ate of productive capacity will be higher than if it faces a higher international inflation. This happens because MA will
eed a lower effort in appreciating nominal exchange rate, and it requires a lower interest rate differential, resulting in
ower levels of real interest rate and, consequently, higher rates of growth of productive capacity.
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Fig. 6. Growth rates of productive capacity (g*) with different international inflation.Fig. 7. Growth rates of productive capacity (g*) with different sovereign spread.
This result calls attention to another way of interpreting external constraint in demand-led growth models. This
means that demand-led growth of productive capacity can be restricted by economic policy objectives (in this case,
inflation target) depending on the external conditions (in this case, international inflation).
4.3.  International  interest  rate  and  sovereign  spread
The same results are obtained when we alter international interest rate (or sovereign spread), indicating another
sources of demand-led growth constraint due to external conditions when a country seeks some economic policy
target.In this case, a rise in international interest rate due to, for example, autonomous changes in US monetary policy,
or a rise in country’s sovereign spread as consequence of a worsen in international liquidity conditions, will result in
lower growth rates of productive capacity (see Fig. 7).This occurs because, in order to maintain the same interest rate
differential, it is necessary that the MA must raise domestic interest rate, with consequences to growth rates of effective
demand and productive capacity.
4.4.  Functional  income  distributionIn Fig. 8 we can see the functional income distribution results to different inflation targets. The conclusion is that
the higher is inflation target, the higher will be the wage share on income. This occurs by two reasons: (1) The real
interest rate will be lower when inflation target is higher, and this will lead to a lower profit rate in the long run; (2)
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eal exchange rate appreciate quicker when inflation target is higher, and this lowers the price level and thus improve
eal wages.
.5.  Some  limits  to  inﬂation  control  in  this  framework
Until now we discussed external constraints to demand-led growth of productive capacity, that is, given some
nternational inflation (or international interest rate levels) the growth rates of productive capacity will be lower, as a
y-product of achieving a pre-established inflation target.
But we also need to considerer the impossibility of a MA in attaining inflation target, depending on the external
onditions of a country, or due to international conditions in general.
As discussed before, given an international inflation, the only way of a country to seek an inflation target when
nflation is cost-pushed is by appreciating constantly the nominal exchange rate.
But the country sometimes can face rising sovereign spreads to finance current account deficits or even an interna-
ional credit rationing (Serrano and Summa, 2015), for exogenous (worsening of international credit markets conditions
nd international credit rationing worldwide) or endogenous (increasing in short run external debt, for example) rea-
ons. If it happens, MA can lose control in attracting short run capital flows and MA can be forced to abandon IT due
o an unstable process of exchange rate depreciation.17
Other limits to inflation control can arise from political disputes over different groups. Some organized political
roups which depend on competitive exchange rates (to export their goods and services, for example) can oppose to a
rocess of real exchange rate appreciation, and if they are successful in stopping the appreciation process, the inflation
ill not converge to its target.
It is important to note that this impossibility of attaining IT can happen even if MA has ‘full credibility’. It is not a
uestion of credibility, but of ‘structural’ external or political conditions. In sum, there are limitations in implementing
uch policy, which depends on the external, political and institutional factors.
.  ConclusionA very important issue about demand-led growth macroeconomic models regards the possible constraints to this
ind of growth. The sraffian supermultiplier states that, assuring the stability conditions,18 capacity output growth
espond to and is sufficient to meet effective demand. One possible constraint to demand-led growth could be
17 In fact, MA can abandon the floating Exchange rate regime and try to stabilish ceilings to nominal exchange rate, but in pratice this kind of
olicy depend for example on the size of stock of international reserves previously accumulated. So, the inflation target policy will last until MA still
as foreign reserves and can control nominal exchange rate.When the stock of foreign reserves is depleted, the inflation target must be abandoned.
18 See Freitas and Serrano (2015).
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balance-of-payment long run sustainability, and there is a vast tradition of models following the Kaldor-Thirlwall
approach that deals with this issue.
However, and this is an insight which can be obtained from the model presented here, even if there is external room
for demand-led growth, some other constraints to the growth of autonomous components of effective demand could
appear. The kind of constraint we explored in this paper is related to the imposition of macroeconomic policy targets
(for example, inflation target or a target of primary surplus/GDP) by policy makers. This can influence the growth rate
of autonomous spending, and thus of the productive capacity.
So, we can say that the demand-led growth model presented here is constrained by economic policy. Also, this
constraint depends mainly on the evolution of country’s external accounts, the international credit market conditions
and international inflation.
The long-run costs of pursuing such policy were evaluated in terms of rate of growth of productive capacity and
functional income distribution to different inflation targets. First, the policy of inflation control is not neutral in terms
of growth rate of productive capacity, since controlling inflation through the nominal exchange rate appreciation needs
a positive interest rate differential, and, as a result, it impacts on the real interest rate and output/capacity growth
rates. Hence, a higher inflation targeting or a lower imported inflation ultimately leads to a higher growth rate of
productive capacity. Finally, the anti-inflationary policy is not neutral in terms of functional income distribution. Since
the distribution depends on the real interest rate and real exchange rate, a lower inflation target will lead to higher real
interest rates and, consequently, the income distribution will change, reducing the wage share.
Thus, in the model presented here the international inflation has a role in influencing the long run growth rate of
productive capacity. This occurs because when the economy experiences a raise in the international inflation, it impacts
on the long run domestic inflation, and the Monetary Authority reacts raising the interest rate differential to appreciate
the nominal exchange rate faster, in order to reach the inflation target. A higher real interest rate is a by-product of
such policy, and has consequences on lowering the growth rate of current output and productive capacity. The external
constraint thus can appear in the form of higher imported inflation.
It is important to notice that there can be limitations to operating such policies. This depends on a country political
and external conditions and international conditions in general, since the policy of inflation control depends largely
on a process of nominal exchange rate appreciation, and this depend on the capacity of MA to set nominal interest
rate and attract short run financial flows. The success of this policy will ultimatelly depends on the country’s external
solvency and liquidity conditions and also on the international credit market conditions.
Finally, it is worth noticing that we are not proposing here a rule of thumb or a stable and well-defined set of choices
between economic policy objetives (inflation target) and outcomes (growth rate of productive capacity and functional
income distribution). What we want to call atention is that in an open-economy, in which growth rate of productive
capacity is demand-led and MA follows some explicit economic policy objectives (like inflation target), there will be
real costs in achieving policy targets, and these costs will depend on external conditions.
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